Candid Confession: Expert Says Putin Has Acknowledged Russia’s Problems Caused by the War

Political strategist Mikhail Sheitelman commented on what he described as Putin’s sensational statements, in which the Russian leader acknowledged Russia’s problems, noting that, judging by these remarks, neither a new wave of mobilization in Russia nor a nuclear strike against Ukraine appears to be imminent, according to Politeka.

He shared his views on his blog.

“Putin delivered three major speeches that amounted to a candid confession. His address at the United Russia congress was fairly routine and straightforward, but there was also a separate interview with Zarubin. As you understand, when Putin gives an interview to Zarubin, it means Putin himself wanted it—he summoned Zarubin and essentially said, ‘You’re going to ask these questions. Here’s the script, and I’ll answer them.’ The third was Putin’s speech at a meeting on the gasoline situation, which he himself had organized. Taken together, all of this amounts to a candid confession,” Sheitelman said.

According to the expert, it seemed as though Putin let his guard down, because his statements, under Russia’s current Criminal Code, could themselves be interpreted as grounds for serious charges of treason. In Sheitelman’s view, Putin spread what Russia officially labels as “fake” information about the war, its own army, and the country’s economic situation.

As Putin himself acknowledged, Sheitelman continued, Russia is facing gasoline shortages and long lines at gas stations, lacks sufficient air defense systems, Ukraine continues to strike Russian infrastructure, and the West has been successfully increasing pressure on Russia. However, Putin did not stop at acknowledging these problems. Instead, the expert noted, he proposed solutions: produce air defense systems faster, improve targeting accuracy, increase missile production more rapidly, repair oil refineries more quickly, and transport more gasoline to Crimea.

“Many experts and serious analysts, including those in the West, feared something entirely different. They feared that Putin would announce another mobilization, use nuclear weapons, employ his army in a different way, or, instead of carrying out senseless strikes on residential buildings, begin targeting military facilities. We feared that Putin would take meaningful steps. In other words, what we really feared was that Putin might suddenly become more competent. That was a separate risk. Nuclear weapons and mobilization are one category of risks. The other risk was that Putin would realize something was fundamentally wrong with the war and begin making decisions that might actually improve his position. That was what we feared. But, as it turns out, those fears were unfounded,” Sheitelman concluded.